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Abstract	
This	 article	 seeks	 to	 review	 the	 recent	 incarnation	of	 a	 long-standing	 engagement	 in	 international	
political	 economy	 (IPE)	 and	 critical	 theory	 between	 open	 Marxist	 perspectives	 (OMPs)	 and	 their	
critics.	 The	 paper	 aims	 to	 identify	 the	 enduring	 relevance	 of	 this	 debate	 in	 order	 to	 constructively	
think	about	the	possibility	and	future	of	critical	social	inquiry	in	our	time.	It	criticises	elements	on	both	
sides	of	the	debate	that	no	longer	serve	but	rather	hinder	achieving	this	objective.	We	argue	that	the	
recent	 criticisms	 make	 a	 number	 of	 important	 constructive	 points	 that	 could	 help	 enhance	 the	
explanatory	 power	 of	 OMPs	 yet	 still	 portray	 the	 latter	 uncharitably.	 We	 propose	 to	 take	 the	
emphasis	on	openness	in	OMPs	seriously	as	a	scholarly	and	political	orientation	without	immersing	
the	debate	with	the	charges	of	reductionism,	instrumentalism,	determinism	and	functionalism	which	
are	frequently	raised	by	various	versions	of	Marxism	against	one	another	–	often	to	little	avail. 
	
1. Introduction	
	
In	this	paper	our	key	objective	is	to	revisit	a	long-standing	scholarly	debate	to	explore	and	assess	
the	 possibility	 and	 future	 of	 critical	 social	 inquiry	 within	 politics	 and	 international	 studies-	 an	
endeavour	initiated	originally	by	Bieler	and	Morton	(2003:	467)	in	the	early	2000s.	To	this	end	we	
aim	to	review	and	critically	engage	with	a	number	of	criticisms	(Bruff,	2009;	Bieler	et.	al.,	2010;	
Tsolakis,	2010;	Susen,	2012;	Elden	and	Morton,	2015)	directed	against	a	heterogeneous	body	of	
scholarship	which	has	come	to	be	identified	as	open	Marxismi.	These	criticisms	have	focused	on	
OMPs’	 explanation	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 international	 political	 economy	 and	 the	 interaction	
between	 globally-defined	 capital	 and	 the	 territorially-defined	 state-form.	 They	 take	 issue	with	
the	ways	in	which	both	the	object	and	method	of	inquiry	(Roberts,	2002)	are	defined	according	to	
OMPs	and	pose	thought-provoking	questions	with	regards	to	the	possibility	of	critique	and	critical	
theory	broadly	understood.	These	critiques,	which	we	present	under	four	main	categories	in	due	
course	following	their	proponents’	categorisation,	represent	the	latest	incarnation	of	an	on-going	
critical	 engagement	 (Barker,	 1978;	 Lacher,	 2002)	 between	 the	 two	 theoretical	 strands	 which	
arguably	 take	 their	 common	 starting	 point	 in	 the	Marxist	 critique	 of	 social	 relations	 and	 social	
inquiry.		
	
With	particular	reference	to	the	more	recent	wave	of	criticisms,	we	argue	that	they	make	a	
number	of	important	constructive	points	that	could	help	enhance	the	explanatory	power	of	OMPs	
but	 portray	 the	 latter	 uncharitably.	We	 further	 argue	 that	 a	 similar	 representation	 can	 also	 be	
found	 in	 the	 first	wave	of	criticism.	This	 representation	takes	the	 form	of	a	 tendency	to	equate	
OMPs	 to	 orthodox	 Marxism.	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 the	 red	 thread	 binding	 these	 critiques	 together,	
impacting	on	their	constructive	value	which	has	had	quite	a	considerable	effect	on	the	tone	and	
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value	of	the	debate	between	OMPs	and	their	critics	not	unlike	the	debates	of	previous	decades	in	
critical	 social	 theory.ii	 It	 should	 be	 added	 that	 responses	 from	 OM	 scholars	 have	 similarly	
reciprocated	 this	 tone	 in	 tackling	 the	 criticisms	 which	 has	 ultimately	 reproduced	 the	 previous	
debates	and	led	to	an	unproductive	impasse.		
	
Given	 the	 current	 level	 of	 the	 debate	 between	OMPs	 and	 their	 critics,	 particularly	 neo-
Gramscian	approaches,	it	seems	odd	to	recall	that	collaborative	work	was	undertaken	by	authors	
from	both	perspectives	(Bieler	et	al.	2006).	Indeed,	the	debate	has	now	ossified	to	such	an	extent	
that	 not	 only	 does	 collaborative	work	 now	 seem	unlikely	 but	 dialogue	 itself	 has	 broken	 down.	
More	 importantly	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 debate	 evolved	 has	 forestalled	 the	 further	
development	 of	 critical	 theory	 in	 IPE	 and	 IR	 as	 originally	 intended	 by	 its	 proponents.	 A	 recent	
example	 of	 this	 debate	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 exchange	 between	 between	 Greig	 Charnock	
(2010:1283,	 1295-1296),	who	 identifies	 the	work	of	Henri	Lefebvre	as	 compatible	with	OMPs	 in	
challenge	 of	 the	 regulation	 approach	 and	 new	 state	 spatialities	 literature,	 and	 Stuart	 Elden	 &	
Adam	 Morton	 (2015:1f1),	 who	 accuse	 Charnock	 of	 claiming	 exclusive	 “proprietorship”	 over	
Lefebvre’s	work.iii	We	do	not	mean	to	claim	that	any	and	all	criticism	is	unfair	but	that	the	nature	
of	 the	 criticism,	 through	 uncharitable	 readings	 and	 the	 conflation	 of	 differing	 perspectives,	
diminishes	the	quality	of	the	debate.		
	
This	is	not	to	suggest	that	this	debate	is	no	longer	meaningful,	or	that	it	has	been	resolved	
to	 everyone’s	 satisfaction.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 this	 paper	 we	 intend	 to	 emphasise	 and	 draw	
attention	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 debate	 for	 the	 scholarship	 as	 a	 whole	 and	 to	 trace	 the	
possibilities	of	how	productive	dialogue	between	two	 important	strands	of	 radical	 thought	may	
resume	on	this	basis.	
	
To	achieve	 this,	we	emphasise	which	criticisms	 in	 fact	address	 the	challenges	of	Marxist	
theorising,	 critical	 theory	 and	 empirical	 inquiry	 as	 a	whole	 and	which	 are	 specifically	 aimed	 at	
OMPs.	 We	 intend	 to	 position	 the	 open	 Marxist	 critique	 of	 mainstream	 and	 other	 Marxist	
approaches	while	 clarifying	 its	purpose	and	boundaries.	 In	doing	 so	we	hope	 the	nature	of	 this	
critical	 engagement	 could	move	 away	 from	a	 pattern	where	 each	 side	 of	 perspectives	 pull	 the	
other	 towards	 the	contours	of	 their	 frameworks	of	 reference	and	push	back	when	these	efforts	
fail.	 Instead	 the	 two	 vantage	points	 could	be	 acknowledged	and	delineated	 in	 a	manner	which	
would	enrich	rather	than	undermine	one	another.	Finally	we	conclude	with	the	implications	of	this	
critical	dialogue	between	these	critical	IR/IPE	theories	on	the	possibility	and	the	future	of	critical	
theory	 and	 social	 empirical	 inquiry.	 This	 is	 deemed	 particularly	 important	 as	 related	 to	 the	
analyses	of	the	recent	and	on-going	global	crisis,	which	present	theoretical	and	methodological	
challenges	 and	 should	 provoke	 new	 forms	 of	 thinking	 within	 the	 study	 of	 critical	 political	
economy.	
	
The	 paper	 begins	 by	 outlining	 the	 current	 critiques	 of	 OMPs	 which	 is	 followed	 by	 an	
account	 of	 open	 Marxism	 that	 responds	 to	 these	 criticisms	 in	 a	 constructive	 fashion	 before	
outlining	the	significance	of	this	debate	more	broadly.	The	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	emphasise	the	
importance	 of	 openness	 and	 historical	 enquiry	 to	 critical	 social	 theory,	 and	 particularly	 the	
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Marxist	 tradition	 with	 an	 understanding	 that	 these	 two	 strands	 of	 radical	 scholarship	 have	 as	
many	 commonalities	 as	 differences	 to	 be	 able	 to	 build	 more	 constructively	 on	 furthering	 the	
debates	 and	 struggles	 of	 emancipation	 in	 contemporary	 capitalism.	 We	 do	 not	 argue	 that	
differences	 should	 be	 overlooked,	 and	 criticisms	 side-lined	 but	 rather	 that	 they	 should	 not	 be	
allowed	to	overshadow	the	common	basis	on	which	OMPs	and	their	critics	stand	so	that	 future	
scholarly	exchanges	can	expand	the	horizons	of	this	debate	meaningfully.	
	
	 	 	 		
	
2. Four	objections	in	two	directions,	or	two	objections	in	four	forms?	
In	a	fashion	similar	to	and	almost	mirroring	the	debates	of	Marxist	theorising	on	capitalist	state	
and	state-society	relations	in	the	pastiv,	the	initial	as	well	as	the	latest	lines	of	critique	advanced	
by	scholars	present	four	main	objections	against	open	Marxist	perspectives:	
	
1. A	 “reluctance	 to	 develop	 a	 historicised	 account	 of	 the	 uneven	 and	 combined	
development	 of	 capitalism”,	 which	 is	 problematic	 as	 it	 does	 not	 explain	 the	
development	 of	 capitalism	 within	 already	 extant,	 pre-capitalist	 territorial	
structures,	states	(Bieler	et.	al.,	2010:27)	
2. The	 rejection	 of	 historical	 periodization	 as	 a	 means	 of	 identifying	 capitalist	
development.	(Bieler	et.	al.,	2010:27	)	
3. A	“residual	state-centrism	within	Open	Marxism,	which	is	anchored	in	a	view	of	the	
state	as	a	de	facto	functional	guarantor	of	the	rotation	of	capital	and	securer	of	the	
conditions	of	capital	accumulation”	and	prioritising	the	“dominant	reproduction	of	
capitalism	 over	 resistance”	 (ibid.;	 Bieler	 and	 Morton,	 2003:	 469,	 475;	 Tsolakis,	
2010:389;	Bieler	&	Morton	2013:29)	
4. A	determinism	concerning	revolutionary	change	based	on	the	assumption	that	the	
capitalist	state	is	doomed	to	collapse.	This	is	based	on	the	idea	that	social	change	is	
itself	 driven	 by	 individual	 revolutionary	 acts	 rather	 than	 collective	 action.	 (Bieler	
and	Morton,	2006:161-162;	Bieler	et.	al.,	2010:27)v	
	
It	could	be	noted	that	the	earlier	critiques	(Bieler	and	Morton,	2003)	were	detailed	and	balanced	in	
their	 specific	 targets	 of	 criticism	within	OMPs	 but	 the	 tone	 of	 the	 critiques	 has	 changed	more	
drastically	in	the	recent	debate	(Bieler	et.	al.	2010)vi.	Nevertheless	the	articulation	of	open	Marxist	
and	neo-Gramscian	perspectives	as	“competing	historical	materialist	perspectives	within	IPE”	has	
been	a	shared	starting	point	of	both	the	initial	and	latest	wave	of	critiques.	The	above	critics	reach	
these	 conclusions	 following	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 “foundations	 of	Open	Marxism”	 (ibid:26;	 Bruff,	
2009:333).	In	our	view,	however,	the	representations	of	OMPs	in	these	criticisms	suffer	from	a	lack	
of	 acknowledgment	 of	 the	 heterogeneous	 character	 of	 this	 scholarship	 and	 conflating	
“foundations”	 with	 subtleties	 in	 individual	 scholars’	 perspectives.	 The	 character	 of	 the	 latest	
debate	also	reflects	frequent	uses	of	argument	from	analogy	by	both	sides	which	aim	to	point	out	
to	 perceived	methodological	 and	 conceptual	 issues	 relating	 to	 uses	 and	 abuses	 of	 abstraction	
(Bonefeld,	 2009;	 Bruff,	 2009,	 Bieler	 et.	 al.	 2010).	 We	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 vital	 to	 approach	 such	
frequent	usage	of	analogies	with	caution	and	acknowledge	 their	 limitations	 since,	despite	 their	
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discursive	strength,	they	may	risk	averting	our	attention	from	the	key	areas	of	consideration	and	
dispute.	
	
In	 various	 accounts	 (Bieler	 &	 Morton	 2003;	 Bruff,	 2009;	 Bieler	 et.	 al.,	 2010),	 the	
aforementioned	problems	are	argued	to	stem	from	an	elemental	issue	underlying	and	intrinsic	to	
OM:	a	“totalising	ontology”	which	conceives	capitalist	social	relations	as	the	“single	constitutive	
source”	 of	 human	activity	 (Bieler	 and	Morton,	 2003:	 473;	Bruff	 2009:333).	 This	 point	 echoes	 an	
earlier	critique	where	abstraction	in	OMPs	is	argued	to	be	reduced	to	the	“constituting	power	of	
labour	within	 a	mode	of	 production”	with	 an	 “almost	 exclusive	 concern	with	 the	 capital-labour	
relation”	(Roberts,	2002:	98,	101).	Coupled	with	the	charges	of	state-centrism	and	functionalism	
that	 correlate	 the	 purpose	 and	 function	 of	 state	 action	 to	 the	maintenance	 of	 capitalist	 social	
relations,	 critics	 suggest	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 pre-capitalist	 social	 formations	 and	 the	 varieties	 of	
capitalism	 and	 state	 forms	 they	 detect	 in	 different	 historical	 periods	 and	 territorial	 contexts	
present	themselves	as	aspects	of	social	reality	unacknowledged	and	unaccounted	for	within	the	
ranks	 of	 OMPs	 (Bieler	 and	 Morton,	 2003:	 474).	 This	 is	 further	 epitomised	 in	 the	 concept	 of	
“epistemological	austerity”	inherent	in	OMPs	(Bruff,	2009:334,	337-339).	
	
Bruff	(ibid.)	in	particular	attributes	to	OMPs	a	latent	essentialism	and	a	tendency	towards	
totalisation	through	a	careful	tracing	and	interpreting	of	particular	phrasing	and	wording	allegedly	
indicative	of	determinism	(such	as	“derive”,	“need”,	“inherently”)	within	the	works	of	a	number	of	
scholars	 who	 have	 been	 homogeneously	 identified	 as	Open	 Marxists.	 Rather	 than	 taking	 into	
account	 the	 heterogeneous	 approaches	within	OMPs,	 authors	 are	 clumped	 together	 such	 that	
one	 author’s	 view	 must	 be	 shared	 by	 all	 OMPs.	 As	 such,	 Bruff	 concludes	 that	 OMPs	 offer	 a	
determinist	 and	 totalising	 ontology	 in	 their	 account	 of	 capitalist	 social	 relations	 as	 inherently	
contradictory	 in	 nature	 (ibid.).	 This	 line	 of	 critique	 is	 very	much	 in	 line	with	 the	 initial	wave	 of	
criticisms	charging	OMPs	of	producing	“a	variant	of	 ‘Theological	Marxism’”	 (Bieler	and	Morton,	
2003:160-1).vii	
	
A	closer	look	into	these	objections	also	reveals	that	there	are	two	distinct	directions	that	link	the	
first	two	points	on	the	one	hand	and	the	final	two	points	on	the	other.	The	argument	against	the	
alleged	 reluctance	 within	 OMPs	 to	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 the	 pre-capitalist	 transition	 into	
capitalism	appears	to	resonate	well	with	the	criticism	against	its	subsequent	refusal	to	provide	a	
historical	 periodisation	 of	 capitalist	 development.	 Similarly	 the	 alleged	 state-centrism	 and	
functionalism	 detected	 in	OMPs	 connects	 to	 the	 critique	 against	 determinism	 regarding	 social	
change	which	is	also	a	point	that	links	to	the	aforementioned	objections	on	the	basis	of	the	role	of	
history	 and	 a	 historicised	 methodology.	 Similar	 lines	 of	 criticism	 from	 OMPs	 have	 also	 been	
voiced	 against	 their	 critics	 in	 their	 response.	 Since	 this	 proves	 to	 be	 a	 largely	 unproductive	
intellectual	exchange,	the	role	of	evident	challenges	at	the	heart	of	the	theorising	of	state	within	
Marxian	 schools	 of	 thought,	 not	 solely	 within	 its	 OM	 or	 Neo-Gramscian	 variant,	 should	 be	
emphasised	here.	 They	demonstrate	 the	difficulties	 present	 in	 each	 strand	of	 theorising	of	 the	
state	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 appear	 in	 the	 form	 of	 individual	 charges	 directed	 from	 one	
perspective	to	another.		
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2.1	The	Transition	to	Capitalism	and	the	Absence	of	Historical	Periodisation	in	OMPs	
The	debates	 regarding	 the	 transition	 from	 feudalism	 to	 capitalism	have	 long	 introduced	
fault	lines	within	different	Marxist	approaches	since	their	inception	in	the	1970s	(Anderson,	1974;	
Brenner,	 1977;	 Sweezy	 et.	 al.,	 1978;	 Holton,	 1985:	 Burnham,	 2002;	 Wood,	 2002;	 Bieler	 and	
Morton,	2013).	As	Wood	(2002:	30)	notes,	 it	represents	an	“irreducible	contradiction…	rooted	in	
the	nature	of	capitalism”	itself.	
It	 has	 also	become	one	of	 the	 fundamental	 lines	of	 critique	 against	OMPs.	This	 critique	
forms	 the	 key	 component	 of	 an	 alleged	 totalising	 ontology	 centred	 solely	 on	 capitalist	 social	
relations	 and	 its	 state-centrism.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 purported	 correspondence	 between	 the	
functions	of	the	capitalist	state	and	the	maintenance	of	capitalist	social	relations.	In	other	words,	
the	 totalising	 nature	 of	 the	 open	 Marxist	 account	 of	 social	 relations	 leads	 to	 the	 state	 being	
inherently	 a	 capitalist	 state.	 Moreover,	 recent	 critics	 have	 claimed,	 following	 the	 first	 wave	
(Barker	 1978:118),	 that	 open	 Marxism	 has	 not	 only	 failed	 to	 account	 for	 the	 historical	
development	of	the	contemporary	state	system	but	argued	that	the	contemporary	state	system	
can	only	be	understood	in	terms	of	capitalist	social	relations	(Bruff	2009:340;	Tsolakis	2010:397;	
Lacher	 2006:54).	 Bieler,	 Bruff	 and	 Morton	 (2010:28)	 maintain	 this	 criticism	 by	 arguing	 that	
Holloway	 (1991:231;	 1994)	 understands	 the	 state	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 development	 of	 global	
capitalist	 relations	 (see	 also	 Susen,	 2012:	 299	with	 respect	 to	Holloway	 (2010)).viii	 They	 further	
support	it	through	reference	to	Bonefeld’s	(2008:67)	assertion	that	the	modern	state	system	and	
the	capitalist	mode	of	production	developed	at	the	same	time,	and	in	tandem.	Their	point,	on	the	
other	 hand,	 is	 that	 not	 all	 states	 developed	 as	 manifestations	 of	 capitalist	 relations	 but	 that	
capitalism	emerged	into	an	already-existing	state	system.	
	
The	 contemporary	 relevance	 of	 the	 transition	 debate	 for	 criticisms	 charged	 against	OM	
rests	more	on	the	alleged	ahistoricism	and	reluctance	to	distinguish	between	“different	forms	of	
state”	 and	 develop	 “a	 periodisation	 of	 the	 capitalist	 mode	 of	 production”	 (Bieler	 and	Morton,	
2003:	474;	2006:	161,	Bruff,	2009:339-340).	The	main	motivation	here,	and	rightfully	so,	appears	
to	be	the	need	for	conceptual	tools	for	the	analysis	of	peripheral,	developing	capitalist	countries	
where	the	likelihood	of	the	co-existence	of	pre-capitalist	and	capitalist	forms	of	social	relations	is	
higher	than	in	the	case	of	the	particular	case	of	English	capitalism	and	state	(Wood,	2002:	21-22).	
An	additional	 and	 related	motivation	 is	 also	 to	 theorise	 “the	 international”,	which	 is	 to	 say	 the	
multiplicity	of	states,	adequately	within	a	Marxist	framework	without	 losing	sight	of	a	theory	of	
the	state.	OMPs	are	argued	to	have	failed	in	providing	such	theoretical	tools	due	to	their	alleged	
conviction	that	capitalist	social	relations	and	the	national	state	system	developed	simultaneously	
and	complementarily	(Bruff,	2009:340;	see	also	Tsolakis,	2010:397-8).		
	
Bruff	re-iterates	his	critique	outlined	 in	the	first	section	along	these	 lines	to	suggest	that	
open	Marxism	puts	 forward	not	 a	 “historical	 determination”	 (quoting	Bonefeld,	 1993:	 21)	but	 a	
“universal-within-historical	determination	of	all	social	relations	by	capitalist	social	relations”	now	
that	the	latter	is	the	“constitutive	source	of	human	social	practice	in	capitalist	societies”	(ibid.:339,	
emphasis	added).	 It	 is	unclear	how	such	a	 reading	of	 the	OM	scholarship	could	be	upheld	 from	
existing	 scholarly	 works	 without	 adhering	 to	 and	 building	 upon	 Bruff’s	 initial	 criticism	 of	
“totalising	ontology”	within	OMPs.	The	critique	is	furthered	with	reference	to	another	quotationix	
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which	was	interpreted	to	mean	“that	all	other	social	relations,	which	in	the	pre-capitalist	era	may	
have	been	constitutive	of	human	activity,	have	in	effect	been	dissolved-	and	even	if	they	continue	
to	exist	in	capitalist	societies,	they	do	so	as	nothing	more	than	expressions	of	the	class	struggle”	
(ibid.:	340,	emphasis	added).	With	reference	to	the	transition	debate	and	the	non-correspondence	
of	the	evolution	of	the	global	capitalism	and	territorial	state	system,	the	conclusion	is	that	“Open	
Marxism	ignores	the	possibility	that	human	social	practice	is	constituted	by	elements	other	than	
simply	the	need	to	extract	surplus	value	from	labour.”	(ibid.).		
	
	
Either	 the	 criticism	 offered	 is	 that	 OMPs	 reject	 the	 existence	 of	 states	 prior	 to	 the	
development	of	capitalism,	or	that	the	mode	of	production	exists	somehow	separately	from	the	
state.	 The	 former	 would	 be	 an	 absurd	 claim	 and	 a	 very	 uncharitable	 interpretation	 of	 OM	
accounts	of	the	state	and	its	historical	development,	the	latter	is	a	deeply	problematic	reading	of	
the	 historical	 development	 of	 capitalism	 that	 necessarily	 separates	 the	 economic	 and	 political	
facets	of	social	relations	–	the	very	antithesis	of	a	Marxist	account	of	social	relations.	The	problem	
of	 historical	 periodization	within	 capitalism	 derives	 directly	 from	 this	 point.	OMPs’	 critics	 have	
suggested	that	absolutism,	a	transitional	social	 form,	existed	between	feudalism	and	capitalism	
(Bieler	 &	 Morton	 2013:30;	 Morton	 2005:497;	 Teschke	 2003:74).	 This	 distinct	 period	 saw	 the	
formation	of	the	sovereign	state	and	the	modern	state	system;	however,	the	authors	argue	this	
period	 took	place	 “before	 the	 emergence	 and	 spread	of	 capitalism”	 (Bieler	&	Morton	2013:30).	
The	 identification	 of	 this	 peculiar	 transitional	 society,	 however,	 raises	 within	Marxist	 historical	
materialism	a	question	about	why	absolutism	needs	to	be	identified	as	a	distinct	historical	epoch	
and	 if	 so	 how	 its	 relationship	with	 social	 relations	 of	 production	 is	 established.	 In	 other	words,	
why	is	it	not,	for	example,	presented	as	the	nascent	manifestation	of	capitalist	social	relations?	
	
This	 point	 of	 criticism	 has	 been	 directed	 before	 (Barker,	 1978:118;	 Lacher,	 2002:153;	
Roberts,	2002:	88)	problematising	the	international/national	linkages	and	the	conflation	from	the	
singular	and	abstract	(capital	relation/	state)	to	the	plural	and	concrete	(capitalist	social	relations/	
states)	as	detected	in	OMPs.	With	reference	to	Holloway	and	Picciotto	(1978),	Barker	notes	that	
the	 scholars	 treat	 the	 state	 “as	 if	 it	 existed	only	 in	 the	 singular”	 (1978:	 118).	 Lacher	 (2002:	 153)	
similarly	emphasises	that	“that	the	capitalist	state	does	not	exist	in	the	singular	but	as	one	among	
many	is	thus	not	directly	given	by	the	capital	relation”.	It	is	worth	noting	that	Lacher’s	own	views	
of	 historical	 materialism	 diverge	 from	 the	 Marxist	 tradition	 in	 a	 number	 of	 key	 ways	 (Burns	
2010:236).	 Indeed,	 Lacher	 (2006:31)	 rejects	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 mode	 of	 production	 to	 the	
historical	 materialist	 method	 as	 well	 as	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 state	 system.	 Tony	 Burns	
(2010:240)	also	criticises	Lacher	for	arguing	that	just	because	the	development	of	capitalism	and	
the	international	state	system	may	have	been	contingent	rather	than	necessary	(an	assertion	that	
Lacher	attributes	to	all	Marxists),	it	does	not	mean	that	they	are	not	related.	Rather,	whether	in	
Burns’	 view	 or	 not,	 we	 contend	 that	 the	 open	 Marxist	 account	 takes	 the	 view	 that	 the	
development	of	 the	 state	 system	and	 capitalist	 social	 relations	was	 contingent	but	 inextricably	
linked.	It	 is	perhaps	best	to	understand	this	in	terms	of	Marx’s	own	characterisation	of	historical	
development	in	The	18th	Brumaire:	
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“Men	make	 their	 own	 history,	 but	 they	 do	 not	make	 it	 as	 they	 please;	 they	 do	 not	
make	it	under	self-selected	circumstances,	but	under	circumstances	existing	already,	
given	and	transmitted	from	the	past.	The	tradition	of	all	dead	generations	weighs	like	
a	 nightmare	 on	 the	 brains	 of	 the	 living.	And	 just	 as	 they	 seem	 to	 be	 occupied	with	
revolutionizing	themselves	and	things,	creating	something	that	did	not	exist	before,	
precisely	in	such	epochs	of	revolutionary	crisis	they	anxiously	conjure	up	the	spirits	of	
the	past	to	their	service,	borrowing	from	them	names,	battle	slogans,	and	costumes	in	
order	 to	 present	 this	 new	 scene	 in	 world	 history	 in	 time-honored	 disguise	 and	
borrowed	language”	([1852]	2012:1)	
	
Following	Marx,	it	could	be	argued	that	capitalism	was	not	born	into	a	vacuum	but	instead	
into	an	already	existing	society.	So,	too,	with	the	state	and,	indeed,	Marx	himself	makes	this	point	
directly	 in	On	The	 Jewish	Question	 ([1843]	2010:14)	by	articulating	how	 the	 capitalist	 state	now	
constitutes	a	different	form	of	relations	between	people.	Marx	([1858]	1993:107)	later	developed	
this	point	in	a	broader	sense:	
	
“Since,	furthermore,	bourgeois	society	is	but	a	form	resulting	from	the	development	
of	 antagonistic	 elements,	 some	 relations	 belonging	 to	 earlier	 forms	 of	 society	 are	
frequently	to	be	found	in	it	but	in	a	crippled	state	or	as	a	travesty	of	their	former	self,	
as	 e.g.	 communal	 property.	While	 it	may	 be	 said,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 categories	 of	
bourgeois	economy	contain	what	is	true	of	all	other	forms	of	society,	the	statement	is	
to	be	 taken	cum	grano	salis.	They	may	contain	 these	 in	a	developed,	or	crippled,	or	
caricatured	form,	but	always	essentially	different.”	
	
In	essence,	therefore,	the	OM	account	of	the	transformation	from	feudalism	to	capitalism	
maintains	 the	 emphasis	 Marx	 placed	 upon	 understanding	 the	 complexity	 of	 social	 life	 more	
broadly.	 Social	 relations	 have	 to	 be	 contextualised	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 historically	 conditioned	
circumstances;	 however,	 they	 can	 only	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 here	 and	 now	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
capitalist	mode	of	production	 in	all	of	 its	 inherent	antagonisms	and	contradictions	 (Marx	[1859]	
1971:20-21;	 Bonefeld	 2009,	 2014:166).	 Once	 this	 is	 understood,	 history	 then	 stops	 being	 a	
“collection	 of	 dead	 facts”	 (Marx	 [1845]	 1998:43).	 OMPs,	 despite	 their	 heterogeneity	 in	 their	
treatment	of	a	number	of	issues	of	common	concern	for	Marxist	theorising	as	a	whole,	emphasise	
this	explicitly	in	their	eponymous	embrace	of	openness:	the	content	and	form	of	class	struggle	is	
not	pre-determined.	
		
The	 general	OM	 account	 of	 state	 development	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 its	 existence	 prior	 to	 the	
development	of	capitalism,	nor	is	it	to	say	that	the	state	exists	independently	of	social	relations,	
but	instead	that	the	state	only	exists	in	and	through	temporally-	and	spatially-conditioned	social	
relations.	As	such,	to	say	that	capitalism	was	born	 into	an	already-developed	state-system	is	as	
analytically	 helpful	 as	 saying	 that	 capitalism	was	 born	 into	 an	 already-developed	 international	
trading	system.	
	
A	 helpful	 basis	 for	 describing	 the	 OM	 understanding	 of	 the	 state	 is	 to	 consider	 Marx’s	
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characterisation	of	apparently	transhistorical	phenomena:	
	
“Proudhon	 and	 others	 naturally	 find	 it	 very	 pleasant,	 when	 they	 do	 not	 know	 the	
historical	 origin	 of	 a	 certain	 economic	 phenomenon,	 to	 give	 it	 a	 historico-
philosophical	explanation	by	going	into	mythology.	Adam	or	Prometheus	bit	upon	the	
scheme	cut	and	dried,	whereupon	it	was	adopted,	etc.	Nothing	is	more	tediously	dry	
than	 the	 dreaming	 locus	 communis…	Whenever	we	 speak,	 therefore,	 of	 production,	
we	 always	 have	 in	 mind	 production	 at	 a	 certain	 stage	 of	 social	 development,	 or	
production	of	social	individuals.”	([1858]	1993:84-85)	
	
And	again	
	
	“The	bourgeois	economy	furnishes	a	key	to	ancient	economy,	etc.	This	 is,	however,	
by	 no	 means	 true	 of	 the	 method	 of	 those	 economists	 who	 blot	 out	 all	 historical	
differences	and	see	the	bourgeois	form	in	all	forms	of	society.	One	can	understand	the	
nature	of	tribute,	tithes,	etc.,	after	one	has	learned	the	nature	of	rent.	But	they	must	
not	be	considered	identical”	([1858]	1993:106)	
	
The	important	point	to	take	here	is	not	that	the	state	did	not	exist	prior	to	the	existence	of	
capitalism	but	this	was	not,	obviously,	a	manifestation	of	the	capitalist	mode	of	production.	The	
state	is	not	a	transhistorical	entity;	moreover,	to	consider	the	modern	state	system	as	something	
that	 is	 not	 somehow	 linked	 to	 the	 characteristic	 of	 social	 relations	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 deeply	
problematic,	especially	from	a	historical	materialist	standpoint.	Therefore	it	seems	more	sensible	
to	conceive	that	the	emergence	of	capitalist	social	relations	transformed	pre-existing	entities	into	
contemporary	capitalist	states.	Undoubtedly,	this	retained	a	phantom	of	their	pre-capitalist	form	
hence	 the	 particular	 national	 character	 of	 these	 states.	 The	 geographical	 organisation	 of,	
particularly	European,	states	conforms	to	ancient	(yet	still	arbitrary)	divisions	–	which	in	our	view	
comprises	the	rationale	for	pursuing	historical	enquiry	within	OMPs.	With	respect	to	the	analysis	
of	economic	policymaking	in	Britain,	Kettell	(2004:	24)	articulates	this	point	clearly	in	noting	that	
alongside	 the	 constraints	 imposed	 by	 the	 capitalist	 state	 form	 and	 class	 struggle,	 “the	 various	
political,	economic,	cultural,	and	ideological	attributes	of	the	particular	state	in	question”	need	to	
be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 order	 to	 comprehensively	 understand	 the	 underlying	 dynamics	 of	
particular	contexts.			
	
Form-analysis	seeks	to	understand	the	variety	of	forms	that	capitalist	social	relations	take;	
however,	this	does	not	necessitate	rejecting	commonalities. Nor	does	it	suggest	that	all	types	of	
assessment	of	different	periods/stages	 and	 forms	of	 capitalist	 social	 relations	within	or	outside	
OMPs	 are	 problematic	 or	 prone	 to	 reification.	 Typologies	 of	 state	 and	 stages	 of	 capitalist	
development	 are	 problematised	 by	 OMPs	 as	 potentially	 side-lining	 the	 significance	 of	 class	
struggle	and	capitalist	social	relations	in	the	analysis	of	the	complexity	of	social	life	(Clarke	1992).	
The	goal	of	OMPs	instead	is	to	understand	how	class	struggle	manifests	in	the	particular	historical	
circumstances	within	and	through	which	the	state	exists	(Burnham	2006:79-81).	
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2.2	 The	 Structural-Functionalist	 Account	 of	 the	 State	 and	 Determinism	 Regarding	 Social	
Change	
The	underlying	logic	behind	this	dual	line	of	critique	of	OMPs,	as	Tsolakis	(2010:393-4)	puts	it,	lies	
in	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 state	 solely	 in	 regard	 to	 its	 function	 in	 capitalist	 social	 relations.	 In	
criticising	Burnham’s	understanding	of	 the	state,	Tsolakis	notes	 that	“the	state,	as	a	 regulative,	
well-defined	complex	of	 institutions,	always	sustains	the	abstract	discipline	of	the	world	market	
by	upholding	the	‘general	 interest’	of	capital	against	particular	corporative	interests	and	against	
labour	demands”	 (ibid.:394).	Moreover	he	contends	 that	OM	“often	conceptualises	 the	state	as	
unitary	 and	 free	 from	 internal	 contradictions	and	 struggle	 (a	 territorial	 entity)...	 by	 virtue	of	 its	
own	disciplining	by	world	money”	(ibid.).	
	
We	contend	that	the	very	fact	that	class	struggle	rests	at	the	heart	of	OMPs	means	that	
the	 state	 is	 conceived	 of	 as	 fundamentally	 contradictory:	 its	 functions	 cannot	 be	 carried	 out	
successfully.	 Indeed,	 this	 criticism	 supposes	 that	 the	 interests	 of	 capital-in-general	 can	 be	
understood	 unambiguously,	 and	 that	 strategies	 in	 pursuit	 of	 them	 can	 even	 be	 meaningfully	
measured	 in	 terms	 of	 success	 or	 failure	 in	 a	 transhistorical	 fashion.	 Both	 of	 these	 points	 are	
explicitly	 rejected	 by	OMPs	 (Burnham	 1994b;	 2006,	 Kettell,	 2008).	 It	 is	 also	worth	 considering	
that	 OMPs’	 use	 of	 form-analysis	 clearly	 rejects	 the	 functionalist	 account	 of	 the	 state,	 instead	
inclining	towards	adopting	what	Burnham	(1994b:	5)	refers	to	as	the	“organisational”	view	of	the	
state.	This	view	of	the	state	derives	first	and	foremost	from	social	relations,	from	which	we	can	
then	understand	how	and	why	the	state	tends	to	behave	in	the	way	that	it	does.	The	criticism	of	
functionalism	presents	this	back	to	front:	one	assumes	the	state	has	a	function	and	from	this	one	
can	 perceive	 the	 hand	 of	 capital	 everywhere.	 This	 criticism,	 then,	 can	 be	 characterised	 as	
anachronistic	–	a	throwback	to	the	Miliband-Poulantzas	debate.			
	
The	Miliband-Poulantzas	debate	perhaps	set	the	terms	and	tone	of	much	theorising	of	the	
state	 and	 subsequent	 debate	 in	Marxist	 theory	 leading	 to	 inherited	 issues	 which	 are	 currently	
under	 criticism	 in	 this	 paper	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 OM/non-OM	 debate.	 In	 its	 predominantly	
accepted,	and	for	some	misconstrued	form,	the	(non-)	debate	(Jessop,	2008:	149)	was	between	
an	instrumentalist	perspective	that	favours	the	overpowering	nature	of	capitalist	elites	upon	the	
state	and	structuralist	perspective	conceiving	the	state	as	structurally	determined	by	the	overall	
characteristic	 of	 the	 social	 formation	 within	 which	 it	 operates	 (Clarke,	 1991:	 19-20).	 With	
hindsight	 there	 has	 been	 a	 recent	 appreciation	 of	 the	 subtleties	 of	 the	 debate	 beyond	 the	
simplistic	and	formulaic	assessments	(Wetherly	et.	al.,	2008).	It	has	been	acknowledged	that	both	
scholars	 in	fact	explored	the	different	aspects	of	the	problem	employing	different	methods	and	
focus,	 both	 perspectives	 carried	 pitfalls	 and	 shortcomings	within	 themselves	 and	 that	 scholars	
attempted	to	overcome	these	limitations	in	their	later	works	towards	a	non-reductionist	analysis	
(Poulantzas,	1978a;	2000,	Wetherly	et.	al.,	2008).	
	
Returning	to	the	contemporary	debate	with	OMPs	on	this	basis,	it	should	be	emphasised	
that	OMPs	place	an	emphasis	on	the	state’s	management	of	the	role	of	money,	labour	and	inter-
state	 relations	due	 to	 the	very	 fact	 that	 it	 arises	out	of	 these	 contradictory	 social	 relations	and	
appears	 autonomous	 from	 them	 (Bonefeld,	Brown,	Burnham,	 1995:	 166).	However,	 in	 line	with	
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the	points	made	by	Roberts	 (2002:	91-99)	regarding	the	role	of	abstraction	 in	Marxist	theory,	 it	
should	be	noted	that	the	level	of	abstraction	in	the	specification	of	the	state-form	is	not	the	same	
as	 the	 specification	 of	 state	management	 (Burnham	 1995:	 102),	 and	more	 precisely,	 statecraft	
(Burnham	1994a:5;	2007).	Therefore	it	fails	to	extend	beyond	the	standard	charges	made	within	
different	Marxist	 strands	 against	 one	 another,	 as	OMPs	 do	 not	 suggest	 that	 the	 functions	 are	
fulfilled	completely	and	without	contradiction	and	disruption.	
	
Bieler	et	al.	 (2010:27)	criticise	OMPs	 for	state-centrism	and,	as	with	Tsolakis	 (2010),	also	
condemn	OM’s	characterisation	of	the	state	as	a	“functional	guarantor”	for	capital	accumulation.	
This	undoubtedly	derives	from	an	account	by	OM	authors	of	states	as	“regulative	agencies”	in	the	
reproduction	 of	 global	 capitalist	 society	 (Burnham	 2001a:110;	 see	 also	 Clarke	 1983:118).	 This	
representation,	however,	fails	to	treat	fairly	the	point	that	these	regulative	agencies	are	seen	by	
OMPs	not	solely	as	regulating	the	reproduction	of	society	by	acting	in	the	interests	of	capital-in	
general,	 which	 they	 cannot	 definitively	 know	 or	 act	 on,	 but	 rather	 they	 are	 first	 and	 foremost	
understood	as	moments	of	social	reproduction	themselves	which	preclude	immediate	moments	
of	closure	and	resolution	to	contradictions	(Clarke	1983:118).	Indeed,	this	point	is	further	clarified	
by	Burnham	(2006:80):	
	
“The	relation	between	the	state	and	the	reproduction	of	capital	is	a	complex	one	and	
it	cannot	be	assumed,	in	a	functionalist	manner,	that	the	state	is	simply	‘determined’	
by	capital	or	that	everything	the	state	does	will	be	in	the	best	interests	of	capital”		
	
As	Panitch	(1994:	65)	similarly	adds:		
	
“To	speak	in	terms	of	functions	is	not	necessarily	improperly	'functionalist'	 insofar	as	
the	 range	of	 structures	 that	might	undertake	 their	performance,	and	 the	conditions	
which	might	mean	their	non-performance,	are	explicitly	problematised”	
	
In	 fact,	 for	 OMPs,	 the	 state	 has	 a	 plethora	 of	 strategies	 available	 to	 it	 with	 which	 to	
manage	social	 relations,	each	of	which	has	 to	be	contextualized	under	very	particular	historical	
and	 geographical	 circumstances	 as	 also	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 (Holloway	 1995:121).	
Moreover,	as	the	state	is	seen	as	a	manifestation	of	capitalist	social	relations,	which	are	inherently	
contradictory,	these	strategies	are	not	successful	in	perpetuity	and	require	continuous	adaptation	
and	 change.	 These	 changes	 have	 been	 characterized	 by	 OM’s	 critics	 at	 a	 level	 of	 abstraction	
different	from	OMPs	as	either	typologies	of	state,	or	stages	of	capitalist	development.		
	
	 The	 criticism	 that	OMPs	 conceive	of	 the	 state	as	 a	unitary	political	 actor	 seems	hard	 to	
accept,	 especially	 given	 the	work	 of	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 in	 determining	 the	 various	 struggles	
over	 policy	 (Burnham	 1990,	 2003;	 Bonefeld	 1993;	 Kettell	 2004;	 Rogers	 2012).	 Bieler	 &	Morton	
(2013:29)	also	make	the	claim	that,	while	authors	such	as	Burnham,	Kettell	and	Rogers	produce	
interesting	work,	 they	 do	 not	 offer	 a	 “class	 analysis	 but	 [revert]	 back	 to	 the	 state-centrism	 so	
characteristic	of	mainstream	IR”.	This	seems	a	particularly	unconstructive	critique	given	the	class	
analysis	 built	 into	 the	methodology	 of	 these	 works	 and	 a	 clear	 acknowledgment	 of	 the	 form-
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analytical	characteristic	of	capitalist	state.	Peter	Burnham	(2006:81)	explicitly	acknowledges	and	
addresses	how	OM’s	abstraction	must	be	complemented	by	historical	analysis,	and	the	analytical	
value	that	can	be	derived	from	it:	
	
“The	high-level	abstractions	of	state	theory	and	the	circuitry	of	capital	are	essential	in	
helping	 to	 clarify	 the	 key	 political	 economy	 problems	 which	 beset	 modern	
governments,	 but	 the	 twists	 and	 turns	 of	 the	 policymaking	 process	 can	 only	 be	
revealed	by	close	empirical	study	of	government	personnel	at	particular	moments	… It	
is	 important	 therefore	 that	 the	 component	parts	of	 the	 ‘state’	 are	disaggregated	 to	
reveal	 the	 struggles	 that	 took	place	 and	 alliances	 that	were	 formed	 among	 the	 key	
actors.”	
	
Rather	than	perpetuating	these	 lines	of	critique	and	mutual	accusation,	we	would	 like	to	
emphasise	 that	 both	 approaches	 in	 fact	 retain	 their	 starting	 point	 in	 the	Marxist	 theorising	 of	
state	and	social	relations	and	provide	insights	into	different	yet	complementary	and	equally	valid	
aspects	 of	 critical	 social	 inquiry.	 They	 both	 also	 retain	 shortcomings	 in	 common	 with	 Marxist	
theorising	of	state.	Tsolakis	 (2010:	388)	suggests	 that	both	OM	and	neo-Gramscian	approaches	
do	 not	 directly	 specify	 the	 state	 as	 a	 terrain	 of	 struggle	 between	 different	 social	 forces	 and	
fractions	of	capital,	endowed	with	the	kind	of	contradictions	brought	by	these	internal/domestic	
actors	and	forces.	In	that	sense	it	is	true	that	OM	does	not	treat	the	state	as	such,	which	could	be	
considered	 as	 a	 strength,	 especially	 in	 comparison	 with	 perspectives	 that	 often	 use	 such	 a	
position	to	propose	the	so-called	neutrality	of	 the	 liberal	pluralist	state.	However,	 this	does	not	
mean	 that	 the	state-form	 itself	 is	devoid	of	 internal	 contradictions.	Quite	 the	contrary.	Various	
concrete	manifestations	of	these	internal	contradictions	can	be	found	in	the	specific	analyses	of	
statecraft	 and	 governing	 strategy	 (Burnham,	 2001;	 2007;	 2011;	 Kettell,	 2004;	 Rogers,	 2009).	
Following	the	 logic	of	critique	employed	by	OM	critics,	Tsolakis’	emphasis	on	conceiving	of	 the	
state	as	a	site	of	struggle	whilst	at	the	same	time	endowing	it	with	a	strategic	selectivity	to	the	
point	where	the	state	“may	be	temporarily	dominated	by	fractions	of	capital...	or	labour”	may	risk	
instrumentalising	 it	 rather	 than	 becoming	 a	 definitive	 solution	 to	 OM’s	 alleged	 structural-
functionalism	(2010:	396).	Conceived	in	this	manner,	the	choice	seems	to	be	between	“capitalist	
state”	or	“state	in	capitalist	society”.	Again,	this	line	of	critique	recreates	older	debates	and	–isms	
within	Marxist	thought,	and	coerces	one	to	take	sides	with	one	or	the	other	instead	of	rejecting	
this	false	dichotomy	and	conceptualising	both	moments	within	the	state-form	(ibid.).		
	
The	conceptualisation	of	 the	state	as	a	manifestation	of	capitalist	social	 relations	means	
that	OMPs	are	at	 least	 sceptical	of	claims	 that	 the	state	can	be	a	 force	 for	emancipatory	social	
change,	and	at	most	totally	rejects	such	claims.	Bieler	at	al	(2010:32-34)	criticise	the	philosophy	of	
revolution	 in	 OM	 as	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	 egocentric	 philosophy	 of	 Max	 Stirner.	 This	
criticism	is	established	through	close	reading	of	the	work	of,	principally,	Psychopedis	(2005)	and	
Holloway	 (2005a;	 2005b).x	 Susen	 (2012:	 311)	 similarly	 charges	 Holloway’s	 (2010)	 approach	 of	
engaging	with	 all	 possible	 –isms	 as	 outlined	 above.	 	On	 this	 basis	 a	 further	 criticism	 is	 derived	
(Bruff	 2009a,	 2009b;	 Bieler	 at	 al.	 2010)	 that	 OM	 rejects	 transhistorical	 qualities	 of	 human	
existence.	This	 seems	particularly	galling	 from	a	Marxist	historical	materialism,	especially	given	
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the	 preference	 of	 the	 critics	 to	 quote	 from	 The	 German	 Ideology	 ([1845]	 1998:2),	 which	
emphasises	 that	 “whenever	 we	 speak,	 therefore,	 of	 production,	 we	 always	 have	 in	 mind	
production	at	a	certain	stage	of	social	development,	or	production	of	social	individuals.”		
	
Regardless	of	the	particular	criticisms	that	could	be	directed	against	these	assessments	in	
terms	 of	 their	 understanding	 of	 OMPs,	 we	would	 like	 to	 emphasise	 that	 there	 is	 considerable	
variation	 among	 the	 individual	 perspectives	 of	 scholars	 within	 broader	 OMPs	 and	 specific,	
relevant	points	of	critique	and	objections	are	certainly	needed	to	move	the	debate	and	dialogue	
forward.	 To	 re-iterate	 our	 core	 argument,	 constructive	 critical	 engagement	 is	 hindered	 when	
broad	generalisations	and	conflation	are	proposed	on	the	basis	of	specific	scholarly	assessments.	
	
	
3. In	Defence	of	Openness	and	the	Implication	for	Critical	Social	Theory	
Before	 initiating	 a	 response	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 two	 directions	 of	 critique,	which	 take	 their	
starting	 point	 from	 the	 argument	 that	 OM	 rests	 upon	 a	 “totalising	 ontology”,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	
delineate	 the	 shared	 premises	 of	 OM	 as	 a	 whole	 rather	 than	 generalising	 from	 the	 individual	
differences	of	viewpoints.	As	noted	earlier	the	body	of	work	under	scrutiny	is	heterogeneous	and	
it	 should	 be	 treated	 as	 such.	 This	 is	 an	 often-adhered	 sensitivity	 by	 the	 proponents	 of	 Neo-
Gramscian	analysis,	who	characterise	their	works	under	the	term	of	“perspective”	and	“approach”	
rather	than	a	“school”	or	an	“-ism.”	Contrastingly	in	the	case	of	OMPs,	the	critics	themselves	tend	
to	totalise	diverse	views	and	perspectives	at	times	and	present	a	 line	of	critique	where	different	
and	 often	 divergent	 views	 of	 scholars	 are	 argued	 to	 produce	 an	 incoherent	 and	 inconsistent	
general	theory	of	capitalist	state	and	social	relations.		
	
The	alleged	state-centrism	and	functionalism	of	OM	is	criticised	referring	 in	particular	to	
works	 such	as	Burnham	 (2001),	Kettell	 (2004;	2008),	Rogers	 (2009).	Simultaneously	 the	 fluidity	
and	 imprecision	 (i.e.	 excessive	 openness)	 of	 the	 OM	 concepts	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 socially	
embedded	 theory	 of	 revolution	 are	 criticised	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 works	 of	 Gunn	 (1992),	
Holloway	 (2005a;	2005b)	and	Psychopedis	 (2005)	 in	particular.	This	 is	particularly	 striking	given	
the	fact	that	Bieler	et.	al.	(2010)	criticise	the	selective	citation	of	Gramsci	and	retreat	to	analogies	
by	Bonefeld	(2009)	in	his	response	to	the	points	raised	by	Bruff	(2009).	Even	though	critics	could	
view	these	divergent	aspects	as	internal	inconsistencies	within	OMPs,	it	nevertheless	yields	an	all	
too	 convenient	 and	generic	 line	of	 critique.	These	 subtleties	 tend	not	 to	be	acknowledged	and	
OMPs	 come	 to	 be	 dismissed	 on	 the	 broad	 grounds	 that	 any	 other	 theoretical	 perspective	 (let	
alone	Marxist)	could	be	judged.		
	
To	avoid	such	shortcomings	it	is	crucial	to	have	a	contextual	account	of	OMPs	since	critical	
ways	of	understanding	society	cannot	be	divorced	from	political	strategies	of	emancipation	and	
transformation.	Therefore	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	conceptual	frameworks	are	influenced	
by	 the	political	and	 ideological	orientation	and	strategies	of	different	Marxist	 interpretations	 in	
transcending	capitalist	social	relations	within	different	historical	contexts.	This	holds	true	also	for	
the	motivations	of	the	recent	criticism	of	OM.	 It	 is	 important,	 then,	to	come	to	terms	with	why	
the	state-form	has	been	conceptualised	in	a	way	which	would	yield	criticisms	in	terms	of	its	close	
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association	with	capitalist	social	relations	and	the	alleged	inflexibility	to	acknowledge	the	latter's	
pre-capitalist	inheritance.		
	
Following	the	principle	of	contextualisation	that	OM	scholars	applied	in	the	case	of	placing	
Gramsci's	thought	within	historical	perspective	(Burnham	1991),	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	global	
crisis	of	the	late	1970s	was	seminal	in	the	emergence	and	development	of	OM.	This	derived	from	
the	 exacerbation	 of	 the	 problems	within	 existing	 socialist	 countries	 and	 their	 repercussions	 on	
theory	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 the	 issues	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 social	 democratic	 project	 and	 larger	
emancipatory	 political	 practice	 in	 Europe.	 Whilst	 both	 the	 Soviet	 experience	 and	 social	
democratic	 political	 practice	 suggested	 the	 possibility,	 albeit	 in	 different	 forms,	 that	 the	 state	
apparatus	could	be	taken	over	and	transformed	for	emancipatory	ends	in	transforming	capitalist	
social	 relations,	 the	 reality	 increasingly	 seemed	 to	 be	 proving	 these	 assumptions	wrong	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 1970s.	The	 limitations	 set	 against	 state	 action	due	 to	 the	dynamics	 of	 capitalist	
accumulation	 were	 a	 recurring	 theme	 of	 the	 Conference	 of	 Socialist	 Economists	 (CSE)	 that	
ultimately	gave	birth	to	the	development	of	open	Marxist	perspectives	 (Clarke,	1991).	 In	such	a	
context,	it	is	not	surprising	that	themes	of	capitalist	crisis	and	the	workings	of	the	capitalist	state	
to	stave	off	the	effects	of	crisis	have	been	the	preliminary	starting	point	and	focus	of	debate	and	
theorising	 within	 OMPs.	 Its	 close	 interaction	 with	 various	 then-prominent	 Marxist	 strands	 of	
thought	from	its	very	inception	also	made	the	OM’s	critical	streak	particularly	pronounced	from	
the	very	start.		
	
Having	provided	this	brief	contextualisation,	Bieler	and	Morton's	characterisation	emerges	
as	a	reasonable	starting	point	in	order	to	fulfil	the	task	of	delineating	the	aforementioned	shared	
premises	of	 the	heterogeneous	OM	perspectives.	They	 characterise	open	Marxism	as	 a	 ‘critical	
theoretical	questioning	of	taken-for-granted	assumptions	about	the	social	world	and	the	practical	
conditions	of	dominance	and	subordination	in	capitalism’	(2003:468).	While	it	seems	likely	that	all	
varieties	 of	 Marxism	 would	 make	 claim	 to	 the	 same	 critical	 credentials,	 open	 Marxist	
perspectives’	value	 lies	 in	 their	starting	point	and	 its	critical	 reappraisal	of	 the	class	antagonism	
between	capital	and	labour.	
	
	 OMPs’	openness	derives	from	an	acknowledgement	of	the	fluidity	and	unpredictability	of	
social	 relations,	 particularly	 class	 struggle.	 This	 openness	 is	 certainly	 a	 response	 to	 the	
determinism	of	structural	Marxism	(Bieler	and	Morton,	2003:	470)	but	reflects	a	more	significant	
acceptance	 of	 how	 class	 struggle	 manifests	 in	 myriad	 and	 unexpected	 ways	 (Bonefeld	 et	 al.	
1992:xvi).	 As	 such,	 openness	 also	 refers	 to	 the	 exploration	 of	 social	 categories	 in	 order	 to	
comprehend	 the	 social	 relations	 that	 underlie	 them	 (ibid.).	 However,	 stemming	 from	 this	
acceptance	 of	 openness	 is	 a	 reliance	 on	 historical	 enquiry:	 an	 acknowledgement	 that	 only	 the	
study	of	history	can	reveal	to	students	of	social	relations	the	ways	in	which	class	struggle	can	and	
has	manifested.	This	aspect	of	open	Marxist	thought	can	be	seen	as	clearly	grounded	upon	Marx’s	
own	musings	on	his	historical	materialist	method.	
	
Most	of	 the	aforementioned	 critiques	have	been	directed	against	 an	allegedly	 totalising	
ontology	 of	 OM	 at	 its	 source	 as	 noted	 earlier.	 However,	 the	 alternative	 proposals	 appear	 to	
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involve	 historical	 periodisation	 of	 capitalist	 development,	 introduction	 of	 various	 categories	 of	
different	types	and	forms	of	states.	This	pluralises	the	conceptual	tools	and/or	introduces	distinct	
categories	 in	 order	 to	 account	 for	 the	 specificity	 of	 each	moment	 and	 form	 of	 broader	 social	
relations.	This	can	be	more	accurately	identified	as	a	golden	mean,	or	Goldilocks,	fallacy	in	which	
OM’s	 theoretical	 practice	 is	 found	 epistemologically	 austere	 and	 an	 infinite	 pluralisation	 of	
heuristics	is	equally	found	to	be	undesirable	but	a	middle	point	is	considered	to	be	“just	right.”		
	
The	crux	of	this	rather	esoteric,	but	still	important,	debate	is	the	fact	that	it	addresses	the	
vital	question	of	the	possibility	and	conditions	of	critique	in	social	theory.	When	stripped	from	the	
particularities	of	 the	OM	vs.	Neo-Gramscian	 (or	broadly	non-OM)	debate,	 a	broader	discussion	
could	 be	 determined	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 implications	 on	 the	 nature,	 boundaries	 and	 method	 of	
critique	in	the	field	of	IR/IPE	as	well	as	more	generally	in	social	theory	and	political	practice	(for	a	
recent	in-depth	assessment	in	this	vein,	Bonefeld,	2014).		
	
The	rationale	of	critics	in	their	quest	to	introduce	myriad	analytical	tools	of	explanation	to	
grasp	 the	 complexity	 of	 social	 reality	 is	 straightforward	 when	 the	 goal	 of	 inquiry	 itself	 is	
understanding	 and/or	 explanation.	 The	 challenge	 arises	 when	 the	 issue	 of	 critique	 is	 taken	 on	
board	 and	 elevated	 to	 become	 a	 key	 objective	 of	 inquiry	 especially	 given	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
concepts	often	tend	to	assume	thing-like	qualities	and/or	treated	as	such.	The	latter	aspect	in	the	
act	of	theorising	and	devising	conceptual	tools	is	what	progressively	brings	critique	its	internally	
connected	dual	 character:	 critique	of	 social	 reality	 and	 critique	of	 the	ways	 of	 theorising	 social	
reality	when	those	theories	fall	into	the	aforementioned	trap	(Bonefeld,	2014,	Chapter	2).		
	
We	believe	this	is	where	OM’s	approach	to	the	abstract-concrete	dialectic	is	the	strongest	
and	most	useful	as	it	forces	us	to	continuously	examine	our	approaches	and	perspectives	with	the	
same	 critical	 gaze	 we	 examine	 our	 objects	 of	 inquiry,	 applying	 the	 same	 criteria	 against	
reification.	Indeed,	this	appears	to	be	one	of	the	major	points	of	Bruff	(2009):	that	OM	does	a	lot	
of	critiquing,	very	 little	explaining	and	to	do	well	 in	 the	 latter	one	needs	his	 tools	–	and	a	 lot	of	
them.	Against	this	background,	OM	could	surely	be	criticised	if	it	has	indeed	come	to	think	that	its	
abstract	constructs	fully	correspond	to	concrete	reality.	However	there	is	plenty	of	evidence	from	
earlier	 and	more	 recent	 OM	 scholarship	 to	 argue	 the	 opposite	 as	 outlined	 earlier.	 If	 anything,	
there	seems	to	be	remarkable	caution	shown	by	these	works	to	avoid	such	forms	of	fetishisation	
to	the	point	where	critics	would	call	it	epistemologically	austere.	
	
On	the	basis	of	the	four	objections	discussed	in	the	first	section	of	the	paper,	critics	argue	
that	 OM	 conceives	 the	 concrete	 to	 be	 solely	 represented	 by	 its	 abstraction	 of	 capitalist	 social	
relations.	 Therefore,	 the	 critique	 is	 synchronised	 between	 a	 “totalising	 ontology”	 and	
“epistemological	austerity”	as	 the	 latter	 is	 linked	to	a	more	elemental	 form	of	 reification	of	 the	
abstract	 in	 concrete	 in	 OM.	 Bieler	 et.	 al.	 (2010)	 emphasise	 that	 the	 unresponsiveness	 of	 OM	
scholars	 toward	 these	 repeated	 critiques	 has	 ultimately	 made	 the	 OM	 standpoint	 difficult	 for	
them	 to	 constructively	 engage	with.	Moreover,	 concerns	 have	 arisen	whether	 it	 could	 ever	 be	
conceived	 to	be	a	plausible	 critical	 IR/IPE	 theory	 at	 all	 or	 be	positioned	 rather	 as	 a	 “neo-realist	
moment	within	 a	Marxist	 perspective”	 (Bieler	 et.	 al.,	 2010:	 29).	 To	put	 forward	 such	a	 critique,	
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however,	brings	about	the	difficulty	of	settling	accounts	with	the	Marxist	building	blocks	of	OMPs	
as	 noted	 earlier	 if	 the	 latter’s	 grounding	 in	 critical	 theory	will	 not	 be	 denied	 altogether	 by	 the	
critics.xi	
	
Having	elaborated	these	objections,	it	could	be	argued	that	they	tend	to	move	the	line	of	
critique	toward	that	of	Marxism	as	a	whole	rather	than	just	OMPs.	This	would	contribute	to	the	
continuation	of	constructive	dialogue	and	debate	between	the	perspectives	 if	the	critics	framed	
the	aforementioned	 criticisms	as	 shared	 concerns	 and	 challenges	of	 theorising	 state	 and	 social	
relations	from	within	a	Marxist	framework.	In	its	current	form,	however,	the	common	ground	the	
OMPs	share	with	 the	different	strands	of	critical	 theory	 remains	unacknowledged	and	pulls	 the	
different	sides	of	the	debate	further	away	from	each	other.	
	
That	is	why	it	is	crucial,	in	our	opinion,	to	locate	this	debate	and	its	seemingly	“competing”	
sides	within	the	common	ground	of	critical	theory	and	inquiry	in	order	to	direct	it	towards	a	more	
constructive	 path	 rather	 than	 allow	 it	 undermine	 each	 side	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 charges	 of	
reductionism,	 instrumentalism,	 determinism,	 functionalism	 and	 not	 being	 truly	 or	 sufficiently	
critical.	 As	 is	 well	 known,	 such	 charges	 are	 frequently	 raised	 by	 various	 versions	 of	 Marxism	
against	one	another	to	little	avail.	In	our	view	this	calls	for	an	urgent	change	in	the	approach	and	
language	of	critical	engagement	within	critical	theory	in	IR/IPE	if	meaningful,	creative	responses	
to	capitalist	crisis	and	ways	of	advancing	theory	and	practice	of	emancipation	is	to	be	thoroughly	
pursued.		
	
4. Conclusion	
In	this	paper,	we	aimed	to	revisit	a	long-standing	scholarly	debate	on	open	Marxist	perspectives	
to	 explore	 and	 assess	 the	 possibility	 and	 future	 of	 critical	 social	 inquiry	 within	 politics	 and	
international	 studies.	 Our	 focus,	 as	 such,	 has	 been	 on	 the	 value	 that	 can	 be	 provided	 by	 a	
substantial	engagement	with	OMPs	in	particular.	We	argue	that	OMPs	deserves	the	utmost	credit	
for	 their	 specific	 contribution	 to	 and	 emphasis	 on	 the	 openness	 of	 our	 theoretical	 constructs.	
However,	the	latest	critiques	in	particular	tend	to	overlook	and/or	mischaracterise	this	aspect	in	a	
fashion	that	would	discredit	its	applicability	to	the	analysis	of	concrete	empirical	cases.		
	
Instead	of	questioning	or	critiquing	the	theoretical	and	conceptual	traditions	on	which	the	
recent	critics	are	based,	we	took	the	main	lines	of	criticism	on	board	in	the	subsequent	sections	of	
the	paper	and	acknowledged	the	valid	points	of	critique	where	applicable.	We	also	demonstrated	
the	unjustifiable	and	misplaced	aspects	of	the	reasoning	behind	some	of	the	criticisms.	
	
On	this	basis	we	argue	that	OMPs’	central	conception	of	critique	and	the	abstract-concrete	
dialectic	continues	to	assert	the	strongest	resistance	against	diverse	modes	of	fetishism	and	for	
this	reason	alone	deserves	to	be	treated	seriously.	The	current	circumstances	of	global	crisis	not	
only	demystify	 the	class	character	of	 social	 relations	and	state	but	also	 shake	 the	ground	upon	
which	many	widely	held	theoretical	assumptions	and	frameworks,	both	mainstream	and	critical,	
have	been	historically	built.		
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As	such,	the	emphasis	on	the	organic	conception	of	crisis	and	critique	as	well	as	the	openness	
found	 in	 its	 critique	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 vitally	 useful	 and	 necessary	 so	 will	 a	 resumption	 of	 a	
constructive	dialogue	between	different	strands	of	critical	theory.	We	would	like	to	re-iterate	our	
point	from	the	introduction	that	these	strands	have	as	much	in	common	as	differences	to	be	able	
to	build	more	constructively	on	furthering	the	debates,	struggles	and	strategies	of	emancipation.		
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i	We	 shall	however	be	using	 the	 term	open	Marxist	perspectives	 (OMPs)	 to	be	able	 to	better	 reflect	 the	
heterogeneous	character	of	this	body	of	scholarship.	
ii	 A	 particularly	 egregious	 example	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 OM	 and	 neo-Gramscian	 authors	 can	 be	
found	in	the	exchange	between	Bonefeld	(2009)	and	Bruff	(2009a;	2009b)	in	BJPIR	11:3.	Indeed,	this	is	an	
unproductive	exchange,	with	little	charity	or	solidarity	from	either	author.	
iii	The	particular	exchange	here	is	a	good	example	of	both	the	lack	of	charity	in	the	debate.	Elden	&	Morton	
(2015:1fn1)	clearly	state	that	Charnock	(in	their	sole	reference	to	him)	offers	a	good	example	of	a	"further	
troubling	 aspect”	 in	 “such	 Open	 Marxism”	 by	 claiming	 proprietorship	 over	 Lefebvre’s	 work.	 However,	
Charnock	(2010:1292)	himself	(on	their	page	reference)	merely	claims	“it	is	possible	to	derive	a	challenge	
to	 the	 structuralism–regulationism	of	 the	NSS	 literature	 from	Lefebvre’s	writing	 on	 space,	 if	we	 accept	
that	Lefebvre’s	ideas	are	consistent	with	his	open	Marxist	mode	of	critical	thought”.	This	is	a	very	distinct	
and	conditional	claim	to	the	one	alleged	by	Elden	&	Morton	and	could	easily,	we	argue,	have	been	taken	
more	charitably.	Thanks	go	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	highlighting	this	point.	
iv	One	indeed	is	reminded	of	the	different	aspects	of	the	infamous	Poulantzas-Miliband	debate	within	the	
OMPs-NG	 debate	 despite	 the	 fact	 that,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 former,	 it	 has	 long	 been	 acknowledged	 that	
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there	was	more	 in	 common	 between	 both	 positions	 than	 differences	 (Jessop,	 2008:	 149;	Holloway	 and	
Picciotto,	1991:	117;	Hay	et.	al.,	2006:	71).	
v	Soderberg	and	Netzen	(2010:106)	also	make	a	criticism,	following	this	same	point,	that	open	Marxists	are	
antagonistic	towards	‘empirically	oriented	sociology’.	This	seems	like	a	problematic	claim	given	the	works	
of	Bonefeld	et	al.	(1995)	Burnham	(1990;	2001b;	2003;	2006),	Kettell	(2004),	Rogers	(2009a;	2009b;	2010)	
vi	We	would	like	to	thank	one	of	our	anonymous	reviewers	for	highlighting	this	point.	
vii	 Adam	 Morton	 (2006:63-64)	 has	 previously,	 and	 quite	 rightly,	 criticized	 mainstream	 ‘critical’	 IPE	
scholarship	 for	 its	 lack	 of	 engagement	with	 class	 struggle,	 instead	 characterizing	 this	writing	 as	 “liberal	
pluralist	 idealism”.	 Ironically,	 Randall	 Germain	 (2007:128),	 offering	 an	 alternative	 and	 non-Marxist	
historical	materialism,	 then	 portrayed	Morton	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	Morton	 himself	 characterizes	 OM,	
describing	 his	 approach	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 “monological	Marxism”.	 In	 another	 example	 of	 scholarly	 parallels,	
Morton’s	own	criticism	of	 IPE	mirrors	 that	of	Peter	Burnham’s	 (1994:221),	who	describes	 it	as	 “a	vulgar,	
fraudulent	discipline”.	
viii	Holloway	(1991)	was	originally	writing	in	terms	of	an	exchange	on	similar	issues	between	Jessop	(1988)	
and	Bonefeld	(1987)	in	the	journal	Capital	&	Class.	These	exchanges	were	ultimately	published	in	Bonefeld	
&	Holloway	 (1992).	 See	 also	Holloway	 (1988).	 Thanks	 go	 to	 an	 anonymous	 reviewer	 for	 suggesting	 this	
point.	
ix	“[h]istory	is	nothing	but	the	movement	of	the	class	struggle”	(Holloway,	1991:	236	quoted	in	Bruff,	2009:	
340).		
x	 However	 the	 content	 of	 this	 critique	 relies	 mainly	 on	 guilt	 by	 association	 in	 our	 view,	 deriving	 from	
Psychopedis’	 (2005:78)	 direct	 reference	 to	 Stirner	 and	 his	 influence	 on	 Marx’s	 understanding	 of	 social	
change.	Psychopedis’	claim	does	not	accept	the	ego-centrism	of	Stirner,	rather	his	argument	follows	the	
form	of	Marx’s	 own	 understanding	 of	 social	 change.	 Psychopedis	 (2005:88-92)	 also	makes	 a	 number	 of	
references	 to	Kant’s	 contributions	 to	 the	debate	on	 social	 change	but	OM’s	 critics	have	 so	 far	 refrained	
from	labeling	OM	a	Liberal	Idealist	theory.	
xi	 This	 could	 be	 explicitly	 seen	 in	 Bruff's	 “alternative”	 proposal	 of	 taking	 the	 transhistorical	 elements	 of	
human	social	practice,	the	need	to	produce,	survive...etc,	as	the	constitutive	starting	point	and	accept	the	
multidimensional	 characteristics	 of	 sources	 of	 human	 practice	 despite	 still	 attributing	 a	 certain	 primacy	
over	capitalist	social	practices	within	capitalist	social	formations	(2009).	For	a	critique	see	Bonefeld	(2009).	
